On April 10, 2024, amidst the high-pitched and polarising campaign for the upcoming national elections in India, Prime Minister Narendra Modi gave a crucial interview to Newsweek, an American publication. Typically, BJP election campaigns place a high premium on strong nationalistic rhetoric concerning security issues. However, this time, Modi took an unexpected stance by significantly softening the tough posture on India-China relations.
In his Newsweek interview, he stated, “Through positive and constructive bilateral engagement at diplomatic and military levels, the two countries will be able to restore and sustain peace and tranquillity at the borders.” While emphasising that the relationship with China is ‘important’ and ‘significant,’ he added, “It is my belief that we need to urgently address the prolonged situation on our borders so that the abnormality in our bilateral interactions can be put behind us. Stable and peaceful relations between India and China are important not just for our two countries but for the entire region and the world.” Reacting positively to Modi’s statements, China also assured that “sound and stable” relations are in the common interest of both countries.
In diplomatic circles, Modi’s recent statements on China have signalled a potential breakthrough towards thawing the strained and estranged bilateral ties between India and China. However, the question arises whether it is possible to achieve lasting peace along the Himalayan borders, given that
21 rounds of core commander-level meetings and 29 meetings of the Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination (WMCC) on India-China border affairs have failed to yield any breakthrough.
After the Galwan crisis in June 2020, which resulted in casualties on both sides, bilateral relations worsened. Following the Galwan standoff, both sides amassed 50,000 troops in a mirror deployment pattern in the Ladakh sector. Despite four rounds of disengagement in Galwan Valley, Pangong Tso, Gogra (PP-17 A), and Hot Springs (PP-15), and ongoing tensions in Depsang and Demchok, tens of thousands of troops remain stationed on both sides of the border. Today, bilateral relations are at their lowest point since the 1962 war.
Nevertheless, as PM Modi has emphasised, relations with China are important and significant. Focused on the goal of a $5 trillion economy, India cannot afford to engage in a major conflict with China and has no intention of doing so. However, with reports of China occupying some Indian territory in Ladakh and India forfeiting patrolling rights in certain areas, the Chinese threat looms large. Additionally, the possibility of a united China-Pakistan front is a scenario that any Indian government would dread. Therefore, how should we address the China question?
India’s Mind and its Dilemmas
The biggest puzzle that troubles the Indian security czars and constitutes the bedrock of Delhi’s current dilemmas regarding diplomatic policy responses is the intent of China. In my interactions with several eminent Indian geostrategic experts, including both practitioner diplomats and academic scholars, I found that there is hardly any clarity on what China wants—whether Beijing aims to amicably settle the boundary issues and make further progress in trade and cultural ties or if it seeks to encroach on India’s territory.
Notably, the Indian strategic community views the boundary issues as the fundamental obstacle to improving bilateral relations. Many experts suggest that India-China ties will improve significantly once there is a breakthrough on the boundary front. However, regarding China’s intent, many Indian scholars and diplomats believe that India can engage with China and resolve the boundary issues through bilateral diplomatic initiatives.
They argue that from 1988 to 2020, before the Galwan crisis, both countries signed bilateral agreements in 1993, 1996, and 2005, which ratified the 1962 ceasefire line as the Line of Actual Control (LAC) to maintain peace and tranquillity on the border while focusing more on building robust trade relationships. As a result, no major differences existed on the LAC, although a grey zone persisted due to the lack of exact demarcation on the ground. Indian and Chinese patrol parties occasionally ventured into areas based on their respective perceptions of the LAC. Moreover, they argue that over the last three decades, until the Galwan incident, India and China had found a modus vivendi to coexist peacefully as neighbours, enhance commercial ties, and de-hyphenate the long-standing boundary issues from the commercial and business sphere.
The opponents of the abovementioned line of thought argue that if China genuinely wanted peace, it would not have instigated the Galwan conflict, which undermined and ruined the trust-building measures established over the last three decades. Even before Galwan, China’s intent was neither transparent nor fair.
In 2009, China constructed a road from Sumdo to Patrol Point 13 in the Depsang plains. The People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) incursions into the Depsang plains in 2011 and 2013 led to face-offs with the Indian Army. In 2014, the PLA made incursions into Chumar (Eastern Ladakh), followed by a prolonged stand-off between the two armies in Doklam, located at the India-Bhutan-China trijunction. Except for the 2011 incursion, which the military leadership managed to resolve, the remaining incidents required higher-level political intervention. Additionally, on various occasions, China has irked India either by issuing stapled visas to the citizens of Kashmir and Arunachal Pradesh or by blocking the designation of Pakistan-sponsored and based terrorist commanders as global terrorists by the UN.
Furthermore, China’s rigid and intransigent attitude towards the boundary issues, despite 21 rounds of core commander-level talks following the Galwan deadlock, coupled with its heavy investment in dual-use infrastructure in the border regions, raises serious suspicions about China’s long-term intent.
Another line of thought argues that the boundary issue is irrelevant to China. It pales into insignificance when contrasted with Beijing’s larger game plan of world domination, which involves subduing India and compelling it to accept its status as an inferior power relative to the ‘mighty Middle Kingdom’ that has existed for eternity. Even the 1962 war was intended to diminish India’s then Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, under whose leadership India was emerging as a global leader among the non-aligned countries. In China’s grand strategy, India cannot exist as an equal civilisational state in its own backyard, challenging China’s status as a world power.
Moreover, there are perceptions that, to counter India’s strong naval presence in the Indian Ocean—where India could potentially blockade China’s shipping routes through the Malacca Strait—Beijing aims to keep India constrained either by propping up the Kashmir issue with its all-weather friend Pakistan and its network of proxy terrorist groups in Kashmir and the Indian hinterland, or by salami-slicing incursions along the India-China border. China may also seek to keep the borders ambiguous at this stage, creating confusion and uncertainty through occasional incursions, and ultimately settle the border at a more opportune moment, such as when it achieves decisive military and technological superiority over India, when India is isolated in global politics, or when there is significant erosion of Western powers’ capabilities and intent to support India against China.
This uncertainty and unease surrounding China’s long-term intentions on the Himalayan borders are increasingly raising alarm bells, primarily due to the scarcity of information. Chinese systems are opaque, unlike those of democratic countries. Additionally, Indian intelligence agencies have primarily focused on Pakistan and its anti-India proxy terrorist groups over the last several decades. Reportedly, they do not have as robust an intelligence network or as reliable assets within Chinese decision-making institutions and circles as they do in Pakistan. The Indian side largely relies on US satellite imagery for intelligence about China’s troop deployments, infrastructure build-up, and other strategic developments in the border areas. Academic scholars mostly depend on official documents from the Chinese government that are available in the public domain, as well as articles published in prominent Chinese newspapers and media portals. Furthermore, the complexity and ambiguity of Chinese influence operations add to the sense of uncertainty and apprehension on the Indian side.
Mapping Escalation Scenarios
In 1962, when the Indian and Chinese armies were locked in a stand-off on the Himalayan borders over the boundary question,
Communist leader Mao Zedong, drawing lessons from classical Chinese tradition, told his commanders that China and India had previously fought ‘one and a half wars’ and that Beijing could seek its strategic direction from history. He narrated two instances of Chinese military intervention in India to his generals. The first war occurred 1,300 years earlier during the rule of the Tang dynasty (618–907 AD), when China sent its military to support a legitimate Indian king fighting against an illegitimate and aggressive rival who was challenging the former’s claim to the throne. After this first war, India and China enjoyed a long period of peace and vibrant cultural, economic, and religious exchange. The ‘half-war,’ according to Mao, took place when Timur, the Mongol ruler, plundered and raided Delhi in 1398 AD, killing at least 100,000 people.
In Mao’s understanding, the key lesson from the two aforementioned historical incidents was that India and China were not ‘doomed to perpetual enmity’ and that they could again enjoy sustained periods of peace and prosperity; however, for that to happen, Beijing had to ‘knock India’ forcefully to bring it to the diplomatic negotiating table.
Under the overarching umbrella of ancient precedents from Chinese history, Mao outlined the modern strategic imperatives for the 1962 war. Weeks later, China invaded India and inflicted a devastating defeat, almost occupying the entire state of modern-day Arunachal Pradesh before retreating to the previous line of control and even returning the captured heavy weaponry. The defeat of 1962 remains a major embarrassment and a deep-seated humiliation etched in the Indian collective psyche.
The incident mentioned above reveals an essential feature of China’s strategic subconscious—its firm anchorage in its civilisational discourse, antecedents, and wisdom, which constitutes the foundation of its modern-day thoughts on diplomacy, war, and strategy. Hence, if history is one of the essential yardsticks for understanding China’s geostrategic posturing, underlying philosophy, and predicting its future actions, then there is a strong likelihood of a 1962-like swift invasion in some sectors and major skirmishes in others.
Some recent reports from credible Western publications and think tanks predict an India-China war between 2025 and 2030. In such a scenario, the possibility of a swift onrush of Chinese troops seven to eight kilometres into Indian territory cannot be ruled out. Additionally, Pakistan may activate the Line of Control (LoC) and foment terror incidents in Kashmir and communal violence in India as diversionary tactics to build pressure on India and facilitate the execution of Beijing’s game plan as swiftly as possible.
In another scenario, China may continue to embarrass and pressure India with its periodic salami-slicing incursions. Coupled with such military actions, India may have to contend with cyber-attacks on its critical infrastructure, military and civil installations, financial institutions, and stock markets, as well as Chinese propaganda wars and economic warfare.
Several crucial factors strengthen the possibility of such a swift Chinese invasion, coupled with an asymmetric and cyber onslaught, most likely in the eastern sector where Arunachal Pradesh is coveted by China. Although most recent incursions and encroachments have occurred in the Ladakh region, given Chinese tactics of deception, it cannot be construed that the bigger invasion will happen in the Western sector. These minor and periodic incursions may well be psychological operations used as diversionary tactics to conceal the real game plan of a mid-sized invasion in the eastern sector of the India-China border.
To further complicate the situation, China may initiate incursions in the middle sector, encourage Nepal to adopt a more aggressive stance on the Indian border and assert its claim over Kalapani, and intensify pressure on Bhutan through increased troop deployments, patrols in disputed areas, or infrastructure build-up. Reportedly, the Chinese believe this middle path of a swift and mid-sized invasion is feasible from a cost-benefit perspective.
Firstly, the invasion is likely to be very rapid, providing minimal response time to the Indian side. Given the backdrop of ongoing psychological operations, uncertainty, and strategic and tactical ambiguity, by the time India fully comprehends the magnitude, intensity, and scale of the conflict and Beijing’s intent, the PLA would have already secured most of its objectives. Secondly, while Indian communications and road infrastructure in the Himalayan region is developing rapidly, there is still a considerable gap to bridge compared to China’s capabilities.
In one of my previous
articles, I have discussed how China has made a sophisticated network of axial roads in the border areas, which facilitates much easier and more rapid movement of their troops and equipment compared to the Indian side. In such a scenario, the Americans could help only by providing intelligence, minor communications equipment, and technological support, enabling smooth logistics. However, they are unlikely to deploy their forces on the ground. The terrain is harsh, and American forces are not even trained to fight in such environments. As regards their high-quality equipment, procurement issues and processes are complex and time-consuming.
Given the ongoing frictions between Washington and Delhi, no significant breakthrough is expected in big-ticket defence deals. Additionally, moving, training, climate and terrain acclimatisation, as well as familiarisation with advanced American equipment, would take much longer. Most importantly, due to terrain and weather limitations, heavy equipment is not even required in many areas. There are very few regions, such as the Depsang Plains, where tanks might be useful. The battles in the Himalayan region are likely to be infantry- and artillery-centric, in which road infrastructure would play a critical role—an area where China has a clear advantage. Additionally, China can utilise its drones and rocket force.
Lastly, in such a scenario, India’s trusted friend Russia would also be unable to exert much pressure on China after the conflict starts. Given Russia’s increased dependence on China following the Ukraine war, its influence would be limited. By the time it could potentially sway Chinese policymakers, Beijing would have secured its gains, after which global powers would likely intervene, urging restraint and diplomacy.
The chances of such a swift, embarrassing, and destabilising attack, and the periodic accidental or deliberate skirmishes escalating into a full-fledged conventional war—with an extremely remote possibility of the conflict going nuclear—are minimal at this stage. If the conflict escalates significantly and becomes prolonged, China will find itself embroiled in a long-drawn and protracted struggle in the difficult Himalayan terrain.
India has also come a long way from its position in 1962. Today, India is a nuclear power and a leader in advanced space programmes. In addition to its robust scientific, technological, and industrial base, with the fourth largest military and the fifth largest GDP, it has a much stronger and more credible standing in global geopolitics. Hence, if the element of surprise and swift offence in a Chinese invasion is neutralised, India can mount a robust defence and counterattack, bringing significant embarrassment to China. Such a scenario would be a major setback to China’s long-term ambitions to become a world power and compete with the US.
Also, with this, India is likely to abandon its neutrality and align more closely with the American side, strengthen ties with Quad countries and the Western camp, and create obstacles for China’s supply lines in the Malacca Strait with its strong naval presence in the Indian Ocean. It could reject the ‘One China’ policy in principle, take a strong anti-China stance by forming alliances with Vietnam, Japan, the Philippines, and Indonesia, and enhance its strategic footprint in regions like the Middle East, Afghanistan, and the South Caucasus. India might also become more active with the Quad countries in the South China Sea and the East China Sea.
The author is a Cornell University graduate in public affairs, bachelors from St Stephen’s College, Delhi, and has done his PhD on Jaish-e-Mohammad. He is a policy analyst specialising in counterterrorism, Indian foreign policy and Afghanistan-Pakistan geopolitics. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the stand of this publication.
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